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1With the rise of interest in international relief, and the birth of an 
unprecedented number of separate relief organizations, mostly small and of 
uncertain experience, there has arisen a demand for coordination of the 
agencies involved. Coordination is usually advocated on the grounds that 
greater efficiency or effectiveness can thereby be achieved. Effectiveness 
tends to be valued above efficiency when life-saving operations are under 
way, while the latter takes precedence as rational, cost-benefit criteria 
are applied to post-crisis recovery (Quarantelli 77:104). It is also 
sometimes suggested that a coordinated approach to relief has good public 
relations appeal for donors, and that order and discipline are to be valued 
as good per se.
With regard to efficiency, the prime objectives of coordination are the 
avoidance of material waste, duplication of effort, excessive coverage, 
and/or loss of time and effort. These objectives can be achieved by the 
sharing of resources, including for example information, transport, 
warehousing facilities, and specialist staff. Efficiency can also be 
achieved by dividing up the disaster area among the helping agencies so 
that each is responsible for delivering to the population in its assigned 
territory all of the services which are needed, A third approach to 
greater efficiency is to organize a division of labor among the agencies 
so that each is responsible for a given service in all or any of the 
affected areas (Taylor 72). A combination of these methods may be used
to great effect
2The secondary objective of coordination in relation to the goal of efficiency 
is the avoidance of counterproductive responses on the part of multiple 
relief agents. In a major disaster, losses in time and effort caused by
the convergence on the scene of countless individuals, organizations, and
/material goods, can be considerable. The affective and normative panoply 
with which disaster is heralded drives many actors to dispatch themselves 
or material assistance to the affected area. However, both personnel and 
material aid are frequently selected on the basis of stereotypical needs 
which are popularly believed to be associated with disasters. These inputs 
are made available, but often without clearly defined purposes or an 
adequate picture of how the additional resources will help. An uncoordi­
nated mass response of this kind imposes a strain on physical space, 
communications facilities, and the patience of victims and those few 
officials who are legitimately involved with the event. It has been hypothe­
sized that the greater the number of outside organizations converging on the 
scene, the greater the amount of interorganizational conflict one can 
expect (Mileti et al 75:90-84; Warheit 68:124). A sufficiently prestigious 
or powerful coordinating body can therefore perform four functions in 
relation to the convergence phenomenon. It can attempt to dissuade unqual­
ified organizations and misguided individuals from lending their presence 
or sending inappropriate assistance; it can issue guidance on what does 
constitute an appropriate response; it can direct that inappropriate aid 
which does arrive into non-harmful channels of activity; and it can assist 
in resolving disputes betv/een the otherwise uncoordinated helping
organizations
3With regard to achieving effectiveness, the prime objective of coordination 
is to ensure that resources are distributed to the areas of greatest need, 
and that they are distributed equitably within areas of similar need. A 
second objective is to ensure that the methods and program norms employed 
by each agency do not conflict with those employed by any other agency, 
Where; many private individuals, private voluntary organizations, government 
departments and intergovernmental agencies are all trying to help in one 
area, there will be many opportunities for conflicting understandings of 
what needs to be done and how programs of assistance should be organized. 
Unless minimal common policies are agreed upon, the available resources are 
likely to be distributed unfairly among the needy; there will be confusion 
and misunderstanding in the minds of the victims; and there will be ample 
room for resentment and bitterness to grow up 'among those differentially 
benefitting. The job of a coordinating agency should be to issue guide­
lines on the relief policies to be pursued, and to facilitate a compati­
bility among the different approaches to relief which are adopted by the 
various helping agencies.
The third objective of coordination which can lead to greater effectiveness 
in the delivery of relief, devolves on the fact that no one relief organi­
zation can provide a complete range of services to the disaster victims. 
Disaster relief and reconstruction in technologically sophisticated 
cultures demands an array of specialists each with their own particular 
skills. The more technologically complex the society rendering relief, the 
more elaborate is the functional differentiation (Kieffer 77:17-18;
4Schneider 57:14). In order that the victims be able to reap the benefit 
of any one service, other complementary services often have to be provided. 
The greater, therefore, is the need for coordination in achieving any given
effect. Indeed, without a coordination of inputs, some will achieve no
/benefit at all. Medicines without appropriately qualified personnel to 
dispense them can be as useless as building materials without the tools to 
work them or credit to buy them.
There are a number of factors which can inhibit coordination in an emergency 
situation. In the first few hours or days after a disaster having sudden 
impact, the physical disruption and disorganization of communications 
facilities makes the contacting of others more difficult. The length of 
time it takes before a true assessment of the gravity of the disaster has 
been formed, allows very different perceptions of needs. Different degrees 
of importance are attached to the event and disagreements reign over whether 
normal procedures should be cast aside and whether unusual cooperation with 
others is justified. However, as transport and telecommunications facilities 
are quickly restored, these reasons lose importance to other, less physical 
obstacles. Chief among these is the normative or ethical basis for the 
relief activity. For the would-be helper, rational considerations are 
suppressed by the heavy charges of emotion attached to the belief that some­
thing should be done quickly. Each volunteer or relief agency has its own 
perception of what is important and urgent, and will wish to pursue these, 
largely irrespective of the perceptions of others. Getting on to do some­
thing generally appears more important than being sure that what is done
5is most appropriate in the circumstances and that it will not conflict with 
others* plans.
The third obstacle to coordination is closely related to the second, but 
depends more specifically on the lack of training of relief agency officials. 
Those who feel that they have special responsibility for developing an emer­
gency program, but who have neither training which would assist them in 
sifting through the options available, nor training which could help them 
to identify points at which their agency*s activities may conflict with the 
programs of others, may too readily alight on a course of action which 
relieves them from pressures of the moment. The internal organizational 
pressures to allocate resources to identifiable ends quickly —  often for 
fund-raising and public relations purposes, combine with an ignorance of 
the dangers of not coordinating, so that spending valuable time with others 
is not awarded the priority which it rightfully deserves.
The fourth obstacle to coordination is the need which many relief agencies 
experience for their own separate, identifiable, public image. This is 
especially true of the private non-governmental organizations which rely on 
public subscription for their support. Each agency feels that it must be 
able to demonstrate to its donor public how its contributions are used and, 
by implication, what the advantages are of contributing to that particular 
agency over contributing to any other similar organization. The competitive 
spirit is anathema to inter-agency coordination. Depending on the organi­
zation in question, individual programs of relief are regularly fashioned
6with an eye to their publicity \alue, rather than according to whether they 
will fit in with a coordinated, effective, and efficient response by all 
agencies*
/
Not only may each relief organization have its own constituency of donors, 
but some also have their own constituencies of victims* Churches or 
affinity groups are prone to have members scattered throughout a disaster- 
affected area* These types of organizations may insist that they should 
have the right to assist their members, and only their members, in all of 
those places, irrespective of the work being done by other organizations 
with the population at large* However, because of the practical difficulty, 
or unacceptability, of distinguishing members from non—members, an affinity 
group may end up by attempting to serve all claimants v/ho approach it for 
assistance* Achieving coordination by allocating different organizations 
to different areas then becomes highly problematic,
A factor which produces a need for coordination and is, of itself, an 
obstacle to achieving it, is the large number of new organizations which 
may be born as a result of an emergency. New and unofficial groups emerge 
in inverse proportion to the degree of public confidence that authorities 
and existing relief agencies have the situation in hand; and in proportion 
to existing opportunities for the participation of would-be helpers in the 
relief effort. When the crisis appears grave but unclearly defined; when 
the officials do not give an immediate lead; where inter-organizational 
coordination is low; and when the community as a whole has relatively
7little experience of* dealing with crisis; then new groups under new leaders 
can be expected to spring into existence (Janis 54:21; Mileti et al 75:72-3). 
Even more than with established relief* agencies, the basis for participation 
in these new groups will be normative rather than utilitarian (Dynes 70:671), 
high stress being placed on the virtue of doing something, rather than on 
selecting the optimal and economically most rational course of action.
Local leaders will emerge (Bates et al 63; Killian 54:69; Mileti et al 75: 
88,124; Taylor et al.76) and are often effective for as long as the needs 
remain elemental. But from the point of view of achieving a coordinated 
response, a difficulty arises in that these leaders operate without any 
necessary allegiance to a central authority (Barton 69:94) and are therefore 
extremely difficult to coordinate in a combined assault.
In the last analysis, coordination is ^ possible only when individual admin­
istrators feel that the sacrifices and effort involved are worthwhile. For 
the greater good, it will be necessary for each to relinquish some autonomy. 
Being coordinated often means being prepared to subject one*s own will to 
that of another. An act of faith is required in the utility of the process, 
even before the potential benefits are evident. Even then, the benefits 
and the costs are unlikely to be distributed evenly among the participating 
organizations. ,
4
If administrators are to be persuaded of the benefits obtainable from 
coordinating with others, then a certain amount of groundwork has to be 
undertaken before a disaster strikes. In particular, it is useful for 
those who are likely to be involved in the administration of the relief
8to establish personal contact with those with whom they are likely to 
correlate. Relief, agencies do not coordinate with one another en masse, 
but via the medium of trust and understanding which is fashioned between 
their respective officials. Secondly, preparedness plans should be drawn 
up which will facilitate coordination. Any ambiguity or uncertainty as to 
which body has the power, or duty, to exercise the coordinating function, 
should be ironed out before the disaster strikes. An appropriate division 
of labor should be made among the various relief agencies likely to be 
involved. Finally, in a society where particularistic-ascriptive social 
norms prevail, denying the legitimacy or usefulness of cooperating v/ith 
comparative strangers, education and training will need to be provided in 
the advantages of coordination with others (Atkinson 66:155; Clifford 56; 
Mileti et al 75:90-1; Parr 69:80).
If efforts dedicated to coordinating with others do not yield perceived 
benefits, then enthusiasm for inter-agency cooperation will wane, and 
funding for the coordination function will become a problem. Where the 
coordination activity is dependent on the voluntary contributions of 
participating organizations, then it can be expected that support will 
eventually be withdrawn, especially where conflict between organizations 
continues (Thompson and Hawkes 62:282) and where compliance with established 
norms becomes mandatory but onerous for those footing the bill. Where 
financing is secured independently of the bodies being coordinated, then 
it is not uncommon for the participating organizations to withdraw their 
cooperation, and for the coordinating body to establish itself in its own 
right as yet another action group possessed of its own program.
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